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FOREWORD 
Low fertility levels in IIASA countries are creating aging populations whose demands 
for health care and income maintenance (social security) will increase to unprecedented 
levels, thereby calling forth policies that will promote increased family care and worklife 
flexibility. The Population Program is examining current patterns of population aging and 
changing lifestyles in IIASA countries, projecting the needs for health and income support 
that such patterns are likely to generate during the next several decades, and considering 
alternative family and employment policies that might reduce the social costs of meeting 
these needs. 
The program is seeking to develop a better understanding of how low fertility and 
mortality combine to create aging populations, with high demands for health and income 
maintenance, and reduced family support systems that can provide that maintenance. The 
research will produce analyses of current demographic patterns in IIASA countries together 
with an assessment of their probable future societal consequences and impacts on the aging. 
It will consider the position of the elderly within changing family structures, review na-
tional policies that promote an enlarged role for family care, and examine the costs and 
benefits of alternative systems for encouraging worklife flexibility by transferring income 
between different periods of life. 
Assessments of the societal consequences of tomorrow's elderly populations must 
begin with population forecasts disaggregated by age. Can the methods used to carry out 
such forecasts be improved? In this article written at IIASA, Nathan Keyfitz addresses 
this question and concludes that while current statistical and mathematical forecasting 
methodology improves our understanding of past trends, the uncertainty of the future 
continues to pose a challenge to forecasting theorists. 
A list of recent IIASA publications on population appears at the end of this reprint. 
ANDREI ROGERS 
Leader 
Population Program 

Can Knowledge 
Improve 
Forecasts? 
Nathan Kgyfitz 
From Auguste Comte onward it has been taken for granted 
that with more knowledge of how society works would come a greater capacity 
to predict its future; indeed prediction has often seemed the main object of 
uncovering the facts and mechanisms of society. Yet rapid increase in knowl-
edge, as presented in scores of journals and hundreds of research monographs, 
has not paid off in forecasting. 
Separation of scholarship and forecasting 
In fact there has been a separation of the research that adds to knowledge from 
writing on the future. With a few exceptions (Bell and Mau 1973), the leading 
contemporary students of social change have not attempted to forecast for soci-
ety or for particular subgroups. One kind of forecasting is done not by social 
scientists, but by journalists and other lay writers, and very few references to 
the professional literature are to be found in their work . Perhaps the profes-
sional literature would be useful for forecasting if only it were seriously applied 
to that purpose . 
The present paper attempts to discover whether there are scientific re-
sults that would help forecasting, results that have been neglected. If there are 
none, what is it in the nature of scholarship that makes it unusable? Surely 
knowledge is better than ignorance-for forecasting or for any other purpose . 
While such an undertaking for the whole of the social sciences would be 
desirable, this article concerns only a small part of the field: population growth 
and numbers. I have chosen this area because so much explicit forecasting goes 
on in it, and because numerical forecasts are easily determined after the event 
to accord or not with what happened. Judging qualitative forecasts of social 
structure is more difficult. Does Weber's bureaucracy or Marx's class struggle 
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provide keys to subsequent history? The difficulty starts with knowing just 
what Weber or Marx said that can be taken as a forecast and goes on to the even 
greater problem of deciding just what happened subsequently. No such prob-
lems appear in respect of population; certain numbers are forecast and can be 
compared with actual numbers when a subsequent census is taken. In an earlier 
article (Keyfitz 1981) I have assembled 1,000 forecasts and compared each with 
the later realization; the comparisons show ample room for improvement. An 
objective methodology for the wider field of social science forecasts is worth 
seeking, but that large task is not undertaken here . 
In demography as elsewhere , a knowledgeable forecaster ought to per-
form better than an ignorant one. And the amount of knowledge that has accu-
mulated in the last two or three decades is great; five major journals and a 
number of regional ones have printed thousands of articles dealing with every 
imaginable aspect of population. Many of these articles deal with the relation 
between population and social change; population and the economy; the way 
that mortality and fertility are interrelated-all of which would seem to have a 
bearing on how population will change in the future. 
Yet population forecasts, like forecasts in sociology in general, tend to 
be self-contained; they use available population data and not much else . Ever 
since Whelpton (1936), 1 the need for considering separately the components of 
population change-births, deaths, and migration-has been recognized, but 
each component has been forecast without taking much account of the theoreti-
cal or empirical literature (Henry 1972). It is as though forecasters have intel-
lectually isolated themselves from the main body of population studies. 
We have in mind less the forecasts of journalists and world modelers 
than the cautious work of professional demographers . Because these are often 
employed by official agencies, they protect themselves by calling their work 
projections. That puts the responsibility for applying them as though they were 
forecasts where it belongs-with the user. 
The projections are often said to be conditional, the arithmetical working 
out of the assumptions made . Yet anyone who has tried to proceed arithmeti-
cally from the assumptions to the projections will find the way blocked at the 
start. Sometimes the assumptions are not stated at all, sometimes they are 
stated in general and approximate terms. Data adequate to reproduce the pro-
jections, which are said to be merely the working out of the consequences of 
the assumptions, are invariably lacking. 
It is because the projections are used as forecasts, and because the condi-
tions on which they are said to be based are so little emphasized or even stated 
by their authors, that I am here taking them as forecasts . Often variants are 
given-high and low as well as medium-but without any indication of the 
probability that the outcome will be straddled by the high and low projections. 
Without information on whether the chance is 50 percent or 99. 9 percent they 
do not add much to the middle variant that is ordinarily used as the forecast. 
Our examination of possibly relevant theory begins with fertility, future 
births being the most problematic part of population forecasts. 
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The fertili~ transition 
The now standard way of looking at the evolution of fertility over the past 
century is known as the demographic transition (Notestein 1945). Put in the 
simplest terms it says that with modernization first the death rate falls, then 
after an interval the birth rate. There are exceptions of course; in France the 
birth and death rates fell early and concurrently, in a slow decline through the 
nineteenth century. The logical implications of the demographic transition are 
unclear. Is it an account only of what happened in the past in Europe and the 
United States, or can it be relied on for the future? Does mortality decline cause 
fertility decline, or merely happen to precede it in the particular cases on rec-
ord? Even if we can be sure that the transition will occur everywhere, we do 
not know the all-important time interval that elapses between the start and the 
end. A main issue of controversy is whether that interval-the number of years 
after the mortality level improves before the birth rate declines substantially-
is in some sense determined by per capita income, or is relatively independent 
of income and is influenced by education, urbanization, and availability of 
contraceptives. 
For many of today's developed countries the long-term decline of fertil-
ity began about 1870 and continued without interruption until 1935. During this 
time the forecasting of fertility was straightforward. Until some ending came 
into view, it seemed safe to suppose that last year's decline would be repeated 
this year and next. The decline seemed to be due to the pressure for upward 
mobility-social capillarity as Arsene Dumont (1890) called it. A couple were 
ambitious for their children, whose social ascent depended on the quality of 
upbringing, and especially on formal education; education was expensive in 
the nineteenth century and could typically be afforded for only a few children. 
Parents preferred to have one or two children who would rise in the world to 
half a dozen who would remain poor. The mechanism seemed one that would 
persist and could be counted on almost indefinitely. Social mobility may well 
correlate with fertility decline across societies, even though Westoff et al. 
(1963) did not find such a correlation among families within American society. 
Whatever the nature of the motivation for diminished childbearing, its 
strength cannot be doubted. When the instruments of contraception were 
hardly known, withdrawal sufficed for Europeans to hold down the number of 
children to those they could provide with property, or could afford to educate 
for a career. 
So much for fertility within marriage. Perhaps the main way that Euro-
peans restricted their fertility was by deferring marriage. John Hajnal (1965) 
shows that at least since the eighteenth century late marriage prevailed through-
out Western Enrope, with the average age of marriage for females rising to 23 
or older, and at least 10 percent of women simply remaining unmarried toward 
the end of the century. Ansley Coale (1978) points out that it was more than 
· reasonable for Malthus to recommend late marriage as the ideal means of fertil-
ity control, for it was the method that was being successfully practiced before 
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his eyes . Susan Watkins (1981) has studied the late phases of Europe's marriage 
changes, and shows how regional differences persist in their traditional pat-
terns, even though there is a degree of convergence. Le Bras and Todd (1981) 
also show the persistence of local differences in this as in other demographic 
matters. 
Thinking of the idea of social mobility as an instrument for forecasting is 
like turning a searchlight on it. Social mobility indeed helps an observer to 
understand the way people act in their jobs and how they make childbearing 
decisions, but what else is it able to do? Any further use of the idea of mobility 
would require that we have some way of measuring its intensity in the individ-
ual without resorting to his fertility as a measure of it. If we had a statistical 
series showing how personal ambition changes over the years, then we could 
objectively test the hypothesis that ambition is a driving force in the demo-
graphic transition; and, if the hypothesis is confirmed, we could use estimates 
of future ambition to predict future childbearing. Merely to state the problem is 
to show that the idea of social mobility does not really do much beyond giving 
one the subjective feeling that he understands a historical process . 
Kingsley Davis (1963) suggests that the problem of too many people 
appears to individual members of the population not as calling for contracep-
tion alone, but rather for a number of functionally equivalent responses. These 
include alternative means of limiting population growth-abortion, deferred 
marriage, rural to urban migration, migration abroad. The collective problem 
of overpopulation is transmitted to individual families, and their responses are 
such as to bring about a degree of homeostasis. One can think of the large 
system of the nation, or, indeed , of a whole continent, as being linked to the 
small system· of the family, so that the latter is responsive to imbalances in the 
former. Signals can be passed downward. For example, a shortage of land in a 
system of private ownership can constitute a signal. Tilly (1978) found that 
agricultural areas in Europe of the early industrial period contained much 
smaller families than areas of incipient industrialization. Where shortage of 
land to inherit inhibits marriage, fertility is held under control; once jobs, even 
low-paying ones in artisanal industry, are available to men and women they 
marry and have children. No one quite knows whether some similar relation 
applies to the present-day developing countries. 
The relation of the larger system-the country or the world-to the 
smaller decision-making group-the couple-is a perpetual problem for de-
mography. In what times and places is there homeostasis, so that population 
pressure in the larger system is answered by restraint in the smaller group? 
With such negative feedback comes stability . In the mechanism expounded by 
Rose Frisch (1978), fecundity falls in times of food shortage, resulting in fewer 
births. Were such a mechanism operative-and many dispute it-it would pro-
vide the kind of negative feedback conducive to stability . But we know that in 
some times and places poverty begets reproduction, which makes for more 
poverty, a destabilizing positive feedback . If we knew more about the relations 
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between the two systems, large and small, forecasting would be facilitated. As 
we have seen, the relation of childbearing to social psychological states like 
ambition or mobility is even more problematic. 
Heterogeneity of underlying causes 
During the 1940s and subsequently Western populations began to grow rapidly 
through natural increase. But this upswing lasted for only two decades, until in 
the 1960s the downtrend resumed. Was the resumption of the downtrend the 
renewed effect of the same causes as had operated up to 1935? Apparently not, 
argues Philippe Aries (1980). The earlier fall in fertility represented a positive 
interest in children. The interest showed itself not in having many, but in the 
welfare and the progress up the social scale of the few that one did have. That 
attitude has altered in recent years-social mobility is not the engine of prog-
ress that it was in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Today it is 
hard for us even to imagine the degree of ambition for social advance that 
drove our parents and grandparents. 
Instead a new motive has come into view, an extension of the individual-
ism that had been developing in Europe during the age of romanticism. People 
now search for a personal identity; they are less inclined to pattern their lives 
on social prescriptions. And seeking to do their own thing means several kinds 
of change: women want jobs, careers, their own sources of income-in short, 
scope for expanding their own personalities. Corresponding changes are taking 
place in men. For adults of both sexes children become a handicap to personal 
expansion if the marriage continues and to a job or remarriage if the marriage 
breaks up. 
Low fertility seems here to stay. A reversal of all aspects of the change 
that goes by the name of women's liberation is unimaginable, and since the 
several aspects seem to be related, even less can we envisage a change in one 
without the others also changing. Those who do not see women quitting their 
jobs and rediscovering the virtues of domesticity, subordination to a husband, 
and prolific childbearing will produce projections for developed countries with 
continued low births. 
What does this mean for the long-term future? Bourgeois-Pichat (1979), 
Easterlin (1973), Clark (1980), Spengler (1978), and other writers see fluctua-
tions in fertility. We will have a stationary population over the long run, but 
with periodic ups and downs. The swings will presumably be imposed on a 
population that over time just replaces itself. It has been thoughtlessly assumed 
that the limits of the natural world, which certainly impose long-run sta-
tionarity, also impose constant births and deaths, a conclusion that hardly fol-
lows. Yet how can one forecast the waves that, as the postwar experience 
shows, can be of substantial amplitude and irregular length? The Lotka theory, 
based on constant age-specific births and deaths imposed on an initially nonsta-
ble age distribution, would give waves of one generation in length. We will 
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look later at the economic theory of fertility, from one version of which waves 
of two generations in length are deduced. To use such theory for forecasting 
would require relatively exact knowledge of wave lengths and amplitudes. 
First effects of development 
For developing countries some increase in fertility tends to occur on the eve of 
modernization. This can be due to improved health and so higher fecundity, 
earlier and more nearly universal marriage, increased illegitimacy, and the 
substitution of bottlefeeding for breastfeeding. Modernization causes the aban-
donment of various traditional practices that curtail fertility, including postpar-
tum sexual abstinence, common in traditional African societies and elsewhere. 
Anatole Romaniuk (1980) offers a useful discussion of such matters in applica-
tion to a rise in fertility in the early stages of modernization in Zaire. In a later 
paper he shows that the same applies to the Canadian Indians, and the fertility 
rise appears to be due to the abrupt shift from prolonged breastfeeding to 
bottlefeeding that took place prior to the large-scale practice of birth control 
(Romaniuk 1981) . 
But timing is the problem here, as with the subsequent phases of the 
demographic transition. The thesis seems correct as an explanation of the past, 
which is all that it claims to be , but because of the unknown time scale , fore-
casters cannot easily apply it. 
Direct and indirect effects of development 
The relation between the later stages of development and fertility has been 
studied by many authors. The work of Heer (1968) can be taken as representa-
tive. Heer found that the direct effect of development is increased literacy and 
declining infant mortality, and that these lower fertility. The study has been 
subject to some criticism, especially because it used cross-sectional material to 
infer longitudinal effects, but its conclusion seems to be consistent with other 
results, and we may suppose here that it is correct. 2 
If it is correct we ought to be able to predict fertility change by predicting 
literacy and infant mortality. But we run up against the same difficulty as 
elsewhere: predicting changes in literacy and infant mortality is not easy. 
Moreover, the response to literacy is probably nonlinear; somewhere there may 
be a threshold, so that it takes a good deal of change in these independent 
variables to bring about the change in fertility. But the threshold is difficult to 
estimate. This makes the timing of the effect hard to state on the basis of 
existing theory and data. 
Mexico illustrates the problem. 3 It has appeared that the persistence of 
high fertility in Mexico, at least until very recently, did not accord with its 
relatively high income, education, and urbanization. Kirk did indeed find some 
regularity, and demonstrated that the transition proceeds increasingly quickly 
in the present period; what took 60 years for the United States (say, 1870 to 
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1930) could well occur in a third of that time today. But when it will occur is 
still not statable . 
Education and fertility 
Much progress is being made throughout the Third World in the spread of 
education. Even countries whose per capita incomes remain low are building 
schools for primary, secondary, and higher education, and are moving quickly 
toward the often mentioned goal of wiping out illiteracy. On the whole they are 
able to outdistance population increase, so the percentage of successive cohorts 
that attends school is growing. This spread of education seems bound to affect 
fertility independently of the growth of income. Barbara Janowitz (1976) lists 
the cross-national studies, most of which show negative correlations between 
fertility and education, then goes on to argue for both a direct and an indirect 
effect through labor force participation and age at marriage. 
As Caldwell (1980) puts it, there are five ways in which education acts: 
1 It reduces the child's potential for work inside and outside the home, 
not only because of the absence of the child from the family while at school, 
but also because traditional tasks come to seem both to him and to his parents 
unfitting for a person of his status. 
2 It increases the cost of children for fees, uniforms, and stationery, 
for extras that will enable the child to participate equally with other children, 
for new kinds of food and other unfamiliar expenditures supported by the 
authority of the school and sought by the child. 
3 While he thus develops initiatives and becomes an independent 
moral force in the family, the child's status as a material dependent in the 
family is emphasized by the school. Laws to protect the child, including pro-
tection against the pressures of parents, are passed simultaneously with plans 
for universal education. 
4 Schooling speeds up cultural change and imposes middle-class val-
ues; these include having few children but ones in whom heavy investment is 
made. One can talk about having schools that will not strain the social fabric, 
that will accept peasant values and prepare the child for the peasant society in 
which he will have to live, but the fact is that the teacher, almost always 
possessed of middle-class aspirations, is hardly likely to strengthen values that 
are opposed to his own. 
5 More specifically, in the contemporary world the school serves as the 
means for propagating values of the Western middle class . These include the 
view that girls are as important as boys and just as much to be educated, that 
white-collar work is better than farming, and that certain kinds of food, cloth-
ing, and housing are essential. 
School textbooks make little mention of traditional practices, rather sup-
posing a modern (i.e . , Western) way of life. And the main message of the 
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schools is not written down in the textbooks. An unspoken thesis is accepted by 
parents, teachers, and pupils: a new way of life has been discovered that is at 
variance with tradition, and it is better than the traditional way. The school 
weakens the subordination of the young to the old, and in this way helps to 
weaken the family as an economic unit. 
The new sort of person produced by the schools demands more from the 
older generation and is less an asset to that generation. Caldwell (1977) has 
shown how the traditional society's way of using the young to add to the in-
come and wealth of the old pushes couples to build large families. It is the 
reversal of the traditional flow of wealth, whereby the young become an ex-
pense rather than a source of material gain, that is responsible for fertility 
decline. 
In summary, according to the thesis developed by Caldwell, the flow of 
wealth upward from the younger to older generations makes for large families, 
and the flow downward for small ones. The modern expansion of education has 
an important role in reversing the flow. The thesis concerning the direction of 
the flow of wealth is convincing, and adds to our understanding of the demo-
graphic transition. I know of no reference to it in the forecasting literature. 
Urbanization 
The cities of the poor countries have increased enormously in population. This 
is shown by the projections of the United Nations and discussed in some detail 
by Blayo (1976). Between 1950 and 1970 the populations of cities in the devel-
oping countries grew by an average of 4.4 percent per year, while the growth 
of their rural population was only 1.6 percent. By 1975 the urban population 
averaged 27 percent of the total in the developing countries, much more in 
Latin America, less in Africa. How does urban growth affect fertility? 
It is argued that people only come to the city because land shortage 
prevents them from earning a living in the countryside; those immigrants to the 
city who live in shantytowns, and have not put their hand on the lowest rung of 
the ladder of upward mobility, are in the same primitive condition as they were . 
before moving, and are cut off from the genuine urban life that would make 
them truly modern. In this situation there is no reason to expect them to curtail 
their childbearing. 
In Europe and the United States urban fertility was typically lower than 
rural, and part of the way that the demographic transition operated was through 
the rural exodus that lowered fertility. No such clearcut relation between mi-
gration and fertility applies around the world today. In some instances the 
fertility of the urban migrants remains as high as that in the countryside from 
which they came. In other instances there is some difference between the two 
levels of fertility, but this may be due to simple selection, and if so the move 
has no effect on overall fertility. Recent work reported by Sidney and Alice 
Goldstein (1981) found that the current fertility of migrants was consistently 
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higher than their own earlier fertility and higher than that of nonmigrants in 
urban areas. On the other hand, the past fertility of migrants was lower than 
that of nonmigrants. The combination suggests both a selective effect and a 
direct influence of migration on childbearing, again a proposition useful for 
understanding city populations but not for forecasting them without some 
measure of the speed of the migration process and the speed of fertility decline. 
Income equality and fertility 
If fertility were a simple function of average income, and income were rising at 
a known rate, we would have an effective forecasting machine. In fact the 
relation between income and fertility is not simple. The crudity of forecasting 
fertility from aggregate measures like income per head or energy consumption 
per head is pointed out by Repetto (1974), Bhattacharyya (1975), and others, 
who claim that the distribution of income has a decided effect. Comparison of 
China and Brazil suggests that the mean and dispersion of income distribution 
may well act independently. The dispersion can be taken as merely the differ-
ence between rural and urban averages, but the more sophisticated index devel-
oped by Kuznets (1975) would seem more appropriate. 
Repetto provides evidence on the effect of income equality in inducing 
fertility decline, mostly in the form of cross-sectional regressions among coun-
tries in which disturbing variables are held constant. The point may have a 
degree of validity, although it is not easily integrated with alternative economic 
hypotheses, or with psychological, sociological, and other mechanisms. 
The primordial model: pQpulation 
presses on land 
Malthus did not set out to forecast population, being content to urge restraint in 
childbearing, which is to say, applying the preventive check in order to fore-
stall nature 's application of the positive check, an increase of mortality. His 
model relates to policy rather than to forecasting. Sometimes, especially in the 
first edition of his Essay, Malthus seems pessimistic enough about people's 
ability to apply the preventive check that one can read a forecast of misery into 
his writing, but at other times, and increasingly as he grew older, he seems 
hopeful that with the advance of education people will indeed restrain their 
childbearing and climb above mere physiological subsistence. 
If Malthus himself was not able to use his model for forecasting, it 
would be rash for us so to use it, especially now that a century and a half have 
gone by, during which much more sophisticated models have appeared. Mal-
thus provides no assistance in forecasting because his writing on population, 
when read in context, is conditional. One may think otherwise after reading the 
first few pages of the first Essay, but in effect he is always saying that if people 
behave in a certain way-which he would deplore their doing-then certain 
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bad consequences will follow. Malthus's model and all his writings were ori-
ented to policy, and only on superficial reading does he appear to be making 
predictions. 
Human capital 
A distinct way of viewing fertility change is provided by the human capital 
school. 4 It has long been noted that a more highly trained labor force is the 
source of much, perhaps most, economic advance. The human capital school 
adopts this proposition and incorporates it in a model in which the household is 
the key decision-making unit. The household has a production function whose 
most important argument is the time of its members . When wages of male 
workers are much higher than those of females, the wife will look after the 
home and the husband will have a job. As wages come closer to equality the 
wife can use her time more effectiveiy, can gain a greater utility by herself 
taking a job. In doing so she has weighed the satisfactions of the labor market 
against those of the home and found the former greater. 
Supposing that the link of fertility to the price of time is correct and 
quantifiable, how might it help forecasting? Presumably only to the degree in 
which the value of time can be forecast. But however elusive future population 
may be, the future value of economic variables is more so. Nonetheless it has 
often been said that models developed to represent the entire economy cannot 
leave out population, and one should take population as an endogenous vari-
able, so that it would be determined by the system of equations in the model , 
just as are interest rates or employment, rather than being imposed from the 
outside. What people say in this regard is different from what they do; until the 
equations relating population to economic variables are known more precisely, 
the gains from endogenizing population will be difficult to secure. 
The Easterlin effect 
An alternative economic model to explain the change of fertility in the later 
phases of the demographic transition is provided by Easterlin (1968 and subse-
quent papers). He emphasizes that a family's economic status relative to its 
aspirations, and relative to its parents ' incomes, is decisive for its fertility per-
formance. Average income for the United States as a whole was higher in the 
1960s than in the 1950s but fertility was lower. Thus average income for people 
of all ages could not explain the baby boom of the 1950s. But relative income 
could. The young adults of the 1950s were a small generation, being the co-
horts born in the 1930s, and they were correspondingly advantaged. They were 
able to enter college without great competition for places; they had no trouble 
finding a first job, since there is a certain age-complementarity in production, 
and young people are needed for certain work; and as they were followed by 
more numerous younger cohorts they were quickly pushed up into positions of 
supervisor, teacher, and so on . Thus at every stage of their careers they found 
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themselves relatively advantaged. The resultant optimism encouraged them to 
have more children. This is the most convincing explanation of the baby boom 
that we have. 
From it follows the obverse: the people born in the 1950s, being a large 
cohort, would have all the disadvantages that correspond to the advantages of 
small cohorts. If the reverse cause works in the reverse direction, they would 
tend to have few children, and that is an explanation of the low birth rate in the 
1970s. The test will come later in the 1980s, when the birth rate ought to rise as 
the small cohorts of the 1960s decide to have many children . There has already 
been some rise of fertility in the United States and other Western countries, but 
the degree to which it will persist remains to be seen. 
Paul Samuelson (1976) elaborates the Easterlin model in a nonlinear 
form that does not possess the property of proceeding asymptotically to sta-
bility, a feature that contrasts with the familiar ergodic properties of linear 
models. The Easterlin model has influenced some forecasts, and the US Bureau 
of the Census is experimenting with it. Ronald Lee (1976) discusses the matter 
and presents some hopeful considerations. 
Accepting that the Easterlin effect really exists, which I firmly believe, 
the question is whether it will show itself in actual birth performance beyond 
the single case of the baby boom of the 1950s. Could it not in the future be 
swamped by some other mechanism, for instance the movement of women into 
the labor market, so that even though fully operative it would not be evident in 
the actual birth series? 
What makes forecasting genuinely difficult is the operation of mech-
anisms that are competing below the surface of demographic phenomena. I do 
not refer to the competition of opposed academic theories , which we also have, 
but to a genuine, albeit hidden, operation of different and opposed causes, with 
sometimes one cause emerging to the surface , sometimes another. 
Notice that the "new home economics " (Becker 1960) explains fertility 
decline primarily by the rise in the value of women 's time , as measured by 
wages for those women who work . For Easterlin the wages and employment 
possibilities of husbands have a positive bearing on fertility , while for Becker it 
is the wages of wives that count, and they are a negative factor. Throughout the 
economic cycle wages of husbands and wives rise and fall together, so we need 
to know which it is that counts. The fertility statistics of the 1980s will tell us 
more about this matter, and demographers are watching them from month to 
month. We have here competing theories, and we cannot be ready to apply 
them to forecasting until we have decided which effect is stronger. A fine 
recent account of the economics of population is presented by T. Paul Schultz 
(1981). 
Opportunity cost 
The _relation between the economy and fertility can be expressed in terms of 
opportunity cost; women will engage in less childbearing the more they are 
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paid for their time outside the home . This hardly explains why in good times 
fertility rises , an unquestioned feature of the economic cycle . But it does help 
us to understand why women took jobs in greater numbers in the 1960s and 
correspondingly had fewer children than , say, in the 1920s; the economy had 
changed so that there was a demand for their services . In addition , the work 
had become much less unpleasant than the typical factory job that was a main 
possibility for women in earlier times . 
Prosperity and fertility 
That the birth rate declines in periods of depression and rises in times of pros-
perity is illustrated by US and European history, although demographers point 
out that the amount of rise and fall varies considerably . In a French survey 
conducted by the lnstitut National d 'Etudes Demographiques (Girard and 
Roussel 1979), 78 percent of the public considered that uncertainty of employ-
ment would cause couples to defer having a child that they wanted; 63 percent 
that it would delay marriage; and 30 percent even thought that it would cause 
parents to give up the idea of having a child altogether. That the public 
" knows" this helps to bring the condition about. Let us disregard any complex-
ity in the relation, and suppose simply what the public supposes-that fertility 
varies in a simple way with the economic cycle . Can that relationship help 
forecasting? 
Not easily , for in order to say what the future population will be we 
would have to know how the economy will behave . To rely on this is to try to 
solve a relatively easy question by first answering a more difficult one. What 
the oscillations of the economy will be over the next 20 or 50 years is much less 
knowable than what the population will be . The usual economic forecasts made 
for three months or one year ahead do not take us far . 
An alternative explanation of 
post-transition waves 
Jean Bourgeois-Pichat (1979) reviews the prospects for an increase in European 
fertility that statistics of births since about 1978 suggest may be starting. He 
cites in regard to the possibility of waves in the post-transition phase , beyond 
the writers mentioned here, a thesis proposed by John Grauman . Individuals 
form their impression of the desirability of few or many children in their own 
childhood; a person who was brought up in a family of two children sees child 
upbringing as no very arduous task, and is in his turn willing to go further and 
have three or four. On the other hand, one who was brought up in a household 
of three or four children could see the drawbacks of so large a number. Such a 
psychological mechanism produces waves of two generations in length, and in 
this respect resembles Easterlin 's relative income mechanism . If two-genera-
tion waves indeed appear , is there any way of making the data tell us whether 
these were produced by the Easterlin or the Grauman mechanism? We ask the 
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question to suggest that very different kinds of mechanisms may be equivalent 
for forecasting purposes. 
Subgroup2 
A natural way of forecasting is to take account of subgroups in a population 
and to suppose that their shifting relative numbers will determine overall fertil-
ity. Changing fertility is the result of the variation in the mix of the several 
groups in the population through time . If Hispanics have higher fertility than 
English speakers and they are increasing as a fraction of the population, then 
the fertility rate will-rise on that account. Such a notion is hardly entitled to be 
called a "theory" of fertility , and yet it underlies a certain amount of demo-
graphic work. 
The case of religion shows how far afield one can go in applying this 
assumption. For some time Catholic fertility was higher than Protestant. Yet to 
assume the persistence of that differential into the present generation would be 
simply wrong (Westoff and Jones 1979). Starting from a situation in which 
Catholic fertility was very little higher than non-Catholic, the differential in-
creased markedly during the baby boom, and then declined to the point where 
the two nearly come together in the mid-1970s. To count on fixed rates holding 
among any of the set of subgroups is a thin reed to which to tie a forecast. 
Childbearing intentions 
Perhaps the theories that we have discussed are too remote and general, a 
feature that lessens their value for forecasting quite apart from whether they are 
true or not. We may well need auxiliary data that come closer to the subject, 
and these may be provided by specially designed surveys. 
Around 1940 it occurred to several students of population, who saw how 
difficult it was to forecast from available demographic series alone, that a new 
kind of information might lead to a higher order of accuracy. If one wants to 
know how many children will be born in the years ahead, can one not just ask 
the women who will be the mothers what their intentions are? And so began a 
long line of investigations, of which the first and most famous was the Indi-
anapolis Survey, in which married women were asked a series of questions to 
elicit their plans for childbearing. Today, after 40 years of effort, this instru-
ment has come to seem uncertain, even controversial (Hendershot and Placek 
1981), although it has been incorporated in the procedures of the US Bureau of 
the Census for official US forecasts. 
Most of the surveys have been confined to married women. To extend 
the questioning to women who are not yet married is not likely to add much 
information; a girl of 15 can hardly give a meaningful answer to the question of 
how many children she intends to have. Presumably the intentions develop in 
the course of interaction between spouses, and even within marriage they 
change over time. The difficulty is that most children are born within a few 
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years of marriage, usually less than a decade. In a typical case a woman mar-
ries at 23 and has whatever number of children she is likely to have by 30. Thus 
the intentions would at best tell something about fertility for a decade ahead. 
And demographers are not especially interested in short-term forecasts; their 
public calls for forecasts 20, 50, even 100 years ahead. 
But even within the short term the surveys have not been able to antici-
pate turning points . (Turning points are what count; insofar as the curve of 
births follows a clear and smooth trend we do well enough with extrapolation, 
and there is no need for expensive surveys of intentions .) A change in the 
economic or social configuration seems to cause couples to change their minds. 
Their expression of intentions is contingent. Put another way, their intentions 
imply a forecast of economic conditions, perhaps the assumption that those 
conditions will remain as they are at the time of the questioning . Insofar as this 
is so , and insofar as we have better ways of forecasting the economy than 
asking young married women, we need at least to interpret data on childbearing 
intentions in a more sophisticated way. 
Ronald Lee (1974) proposes such an interpretation . He would not splice 
the intentions data onto the actual birth series, but would consider the inten-
tions themselves as a series , and draw conclusions from the way they change. 
A more thoroughgoing change in the procedure is proposed by Clyde 
and Lolagene Coombs (Coombs et al. 1975) . They do not stop with one ques-
tion on number of children intended , but seek the entire preference scale of the 
couple, with respect both to sex and to number of children, since these are not 
independent. The woman may say she intends to have two children; she is then 
asked whether she would prefer one child as against three, and so on . A map of 
the entire preference set is more informative than the single number represent-
ing its maximum value. 
This article , studying the relation of knowledge to forecasting, has con-
fined itself to the knowledge side and has not discussed forecasting at any 
length, beyond the asssertion that the level of theory here taken up is not men-
tioned by forecasters . I have not seen many such references in the published 
official forecasts , and even less do they appear in the innumerable unpublished 
consultants ' memoranda and reports that constitute the largest part of the total 
forecasting activity . 
Yet some account of how forecasting is done, and might be done , with 
emphasis on numbers, is here required. 
Statistical methods 
Should one abandon the effort to bring demographic knowledge and theory into 
forecasting work and simply use statistical methods? Some experiments sug-
gest this . Lee (197 4) applies the technique of Box and Jenkins (1970), based on 
analysis of the internal structure of a time series, to a series of births and finds a 
good fit. The Box and Jenkins method starts with calculation of the serial 
correlations, and assumes that these are constant through time . The work of 
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Lee, as well as of McDonald (1979) , shows that under certain circumstances 
the results of this method are superior to those using more conventional demo-
graphic methods. This is also the conclusion reached by Saboia (1977) . 
But we must not take for granted that statistical methods, of Box-Jenkins 
or other description , can be applied to birth series. The constant underlying 
structure assumed does not persist long enough in demographic data for the 
fitting to be effective. This is why Lee argues only for provisional acceptance 
of the method into the demographer's tool kit. 
Mathematical methods 
The use of curves for extrapolation is the classic method of forecasting. Some 
populations look as though they were growing exponentially, and indeed for 
the very short term simply applying the past ratio of increase does not do badly. 
Once it was thoroughly understood that exponential growth over a long period 
is impossible, demographers resorted to logistic growth,5 which at least recog-
nized a limit on the possible size of the population . One of the objections to 
such methods is that they deal with the population as a whole , instead of con-
sidering the separate components of birth, death, and migration, and that they 
disregard age . 
Work by Brass6 over the past decade has provided by far the most effec-
tive examples of what I am here calling mathematical methods . His relational 
approach, first developed for mortality and then extended to fertility and to 
marriage, transforms age-specific rates in order to make their variation with 
age more tractable , indeed brings it close to a straight line, and then sees how 
the parameters of this straight line have been changing over time. The approach 
is a powerful one, as has been shown in extensive applications to populations 
on all continents. 
Although not developed specifically for forecasting, the method of Coale 
·and McNeil (1972) for dealing with nuptiality has potential in this direction. 
Th~ model supposes that women reach a marriageable age and then are subject 
to delays, random in length, corresponding to meeting a future husband, be-
coming engaged, and getting married . If the delays are suitably distributed, 
Coale and McNeil show, one ends up with a three-parameter curve that is a 
good fit to the distribution of ages at marriage. 
If one is frankly proceeding by extrapolation, then the crucial question 
becomes what elements descriptive of mortality or fertility one ought to extrap-
olate by. If one were to extrapolate the age-specific death rates, age by age, 
using virtually any formula, one would obtain highly irregular rates within a 
very few cycles of projection. On a straight-line projection age by age, many 
ages would soon show negative death rates. One plainly ought to summarize 
the rates into some minimum parameter set, and this is what Brass did in 
initiating his promising approach . An alternative procedure was employed 
some time ago by Ledermann and Breas (1959), who found that two or three 
dimensions adequately describe the underlying data set. Their work has re-
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cently been applied to forecasting by Le Bras and Tapinos (1979). They used 
three factors, expectation of life at birth, juvenile mortality (death rate for the 
age interval 10-25), and mature mortality (death rate for the age interval 
50-7 5). These accounted for 97 percent of the variance of the logarithms of the 
age-specific death rates . 
Distinguishing between a behavioral model and extrapolation is not as 
straightforward as the words suggest. The logistic curve is behavioral, in the 
sense that a story can be attached to it: populations increase rapidly when they 
are a negligible element in their environment; as they increase and take up 
appreciable portions of the resources available their growth slows; when they 
come close to the ceiling above which there are no resources left for their 
expansion, they gradually slow to a zero rate of increase. Raymond Pearl 
(1924; Pearl and Gould 1936) told the story at much greater length. One could 
safely count on moving forward on the logistic curve as long as resources 
remained constant; when resources took a jump, population moved up to a 
higher curve. The American Indians moved along a logistic suited to their 
manner of exploiting the environment; industrial civilization moves on a much 
higher logistic for the same territory. Experiments with fruit flies having lim-
ited food and contained in bottles seemed to verify the mechanism that the 
logistic described. 
Yet is this account of behavior more than a description of the mathemati-
cal curve? How much does the description increase our confidence that the 
curve will be followed in the future? Perhaps it does subjectively, but in the 
case of the logistic there is little evidence that the curve following this rationale 
fits better to historical series than the cumulative normal, which resembles it 
enough that one could not tell the difference with the naked eye . Does the story 
really help when, as it turns out, other curves to which no story is attachable fit 
population series almost as well as does the logistic? 
The recalcitrance of the data, their unwillingness to distinguish between 
theories, is one of the frustrations of empirical study that demography shares 
with other fields . The problem emerges in extreme form when we fit a logistic, 
which on the face of it is a possible trajectory, and compare it with a fitted 
hyperbola, which cannot possibly represent the future evolution of the popula-
tion, since it goes off to infinity within a generation or two. 
Discussion 
In this review of the most prominent theories of population growth we have 
found far too little that helps in the day-to-day work of the forecaster. There 
seem to be at least six reasons why perfectly valid research that produces an 
important theoretical relation cannot be usefully incorporated in forecasts. 
1 Much theory is deliberately cast in the form of comparative statics 
and provides conditional results that are important, but these are neither in-
tended nor usable for prediction, which requires dynamic and unconditional 
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models. Data are often assembled in the form of cross-sectional comparisons , 
while what the forecaster is tied to is longitudinal sequences , which can be very 
different. The comparative statics models are true , given their conditions , but 
they cannot be separated from those conditions; the empirical cross-sectional 
results are true for the material from which they were derived , but cannot be 
counted on for other times and places, and certainly not for future times. 
Many studies have been of the form "If education increases , then after a 
certain point, everything else remaining constant, fertility will fall." That is a 
valuable kind of knowledge, even though it is not very helpful for forecasting: 
we know that everything else will not remain the same . 
2 The theory may be irrefutably true , either because it is a logical 
relation or because it is based on incontrovertible data and relevant to the fu-
ture , and still its effect may be swamped by other relations . The Easterlin effect 
does exist: couples do tend to have more children when their cohort is small 
and their financial position is relatively good. We have always known that in 
times of economic depression births are postponed, and some are never made 
up, and that in times of prosperity births increase . The Easterlin hypothesis 
specializes this to couples of childbearing age, and takes their incomes not 
absolutely but in relation to the incomes of their parents . The effect did appear 
in the baby boom of the 1950s. But since the 1960s a force has arisen that 
opposes this effect, which , for brevity 's sake, can be called women 's libera-
tion . If women want to work, and have their importance in the world outside 
the confines of the family as men have always had, then they will have fewer 
children. The Easterlin effect is still there, but it is masked by the liberation 
effect. A few more years into the 1980s will tell us which of the two effects 
dominates. Meanwhile the forecaster does not know which one to trust, yet 
they point to very different numbers of births. 
3 The theory may be true and relevant and not opposed by contrary 
effects , but its timing may be obscure . Thus in present poor countries, births 
will certainly fall once deaths have fallen, but how can we tell whether they 
will fall in five years or in 30 years? If in 30 years, the subsequent population 
could be more than twice as great as if the fall occurred in five years; the effect 
of timing is not negligible . 
4 The theory may relate fertility to other variables in a perfectly valid 
way, but we have no means of forecasting those other variables . Thus, even if 
we could be certain that equality in a society contributes to its capacity to 
reduce its birth rate, and that in the later phases of development equality in-
creases, we still could not easily forecast how rapidly this would happen. We 
know that if women in poor countries stop using packaged formulas and nurse 
their babies, the birth rate will fall, but we have no way of knowing when the 
change in infant feeding will occur. For advanced countries we may conjecture 
that there will be a rise in fertility once the present recession lifts, but we do not 
know when the recession will lift. Without some indication of the timing, the 
relation is interesting to work out but not usable for forecasting. 
5 Even if we know the timing, the relation can change unpredictably. 
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The end of the demographic transition in the 1930s gave way to the baby boom 
of the 1940s and 1950s. And after that, as Aries showed, nineteenth-century 
"familism" gave way to late twentieth-century individualism; and from the 
1960s onward people came to be concerned with their personal identities, in 
which children fit less well. No one can say now whether there will be a return 
to the past in this respect, or a change in some wholly new direction. 
6 Finally, everything about the relation may be known , but of too short 
term for the forecasting intervals that ar:e of greatest interest. Economic fore-
casts of next year's income will help only a little, and women 's statements 
about their childbearing intentions not much more. Forecasts of weather and 
earthquakes, where the next few hours are the subject of interest, and of unem-
ployment, where the next year or two is what counts, are difficult enough. 
Population forecasts, where one peers a generation or two ahead, are even 
more difficult . 
The scholarly literature aims 
at understanding 
Much of the literature is designed to help us to understand past trends and 
developments. Caldwell provides a clear idea of the way education and the 
flow of wealth contribute to the fall of the birth rate. Dumont's social mobility 
(called by him capillarity) helps us to understand the fertility decline up to 
World War II, and Aries's (1980) liberation effect accounts for the current de-
cline to well below replacement fertility. The Harris and Todaro (Todaro, 1976; 
Rempel, 1981) lottery for city jobs gives a rational explanation of why people 
migrate to the city and why they remain there even when they find no jobs. 
Like the economist's opportunity cost of women's time, these hypotheses are 
intended to give certitude to our thinking about qualitative aspects of demo-
graphic change. That is a different order of knowledge from what the forecaster 
requires. 
To ask of an article in this or any other professional journal how much 
help it offers in forecasting the future is undoubtedly too severe as a general 
criterion . At best we will take a very long time to build up the stock of knowl-
edge required. Policy advice can be offered on the basis of a different and 
easier kind of knowledge, which might be called conditional . It answers such a 
question as, if everything remains the same, what would be the effect of lower-
ing the age at which people can start to draw social security . Or if everything 
(say in India) remains the same, what would be the effect of raising the mini-
mum age of marriage? These questions can be answered satisfactorily (indeed 
answering them is what the demographer does best) without saying what will 
actually happen in the future. 
At one time demographers thought that they could get away with such 
conditional forecasts for future population, but now they realize that their pub-
lic wants to know what will really happen . Perhaps the user is a government 
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concerned with the solvency of its highway fund , and it wants to know the size 
and distribution of population over the next generation . A telephone company 
has a similar interest. A toy manufacturer wants to know the number of chil-
dren over a decade to come. The financial authorities try to anticipate the con-
dition of the Social Security and Medicare funds. To such users a conditional 
answer is an evasion. They have no way of dealing with it in the models they 
construct for their particular purposes. 
For policy purposes causal knowledge is essential; for forecasting it is 
desirable, of course, but the forecast is not necessarily a failure if the causal 
mechanism remains undiscovered. Observed regularities serve perfectly well 
for forecasting as long as they continue to hold, and such successes as there 
have been in forecasting are based on observed regularities . It is not necessary 
to understand everything that has happened in the past to extrapolate the rele-
vant series into the future . Statistical and mathematical methods applied to the 
birth, death, and migration series, making no reference to other series or to 
behavior, up to a point circumvent the need for causal understanding . 
What emerges from all this is the realization that forecasting is more 
problematical than demographic research, which tends to center on understand-
ing the past-no mean task in itself-and on inferring conditional causal rela-
tions that are useful for policy advice. We have found few instances in which 
understanding of the past and the conditional relations can be brought to bear 
on forecasting. 
Forecasting is difficult, and no one should pretend to develop "methods" 
for doing it. A method that would take account of future wars, plagues, and 
prosperity is no more likely to be discovered than a method for changing the 
earth's orbit. What we can seek with some hope of success is a statistical 
procedure that will marginally reduce the error made in past forecasts. 
Thus at the end of this lengthy search we are driven back to statistical 
and mathematical methods that in one form or another, since they do not de-
pend on outside knowledge or relations beyond the demographic series them-
selves, can only be called extrapolatory. Pending the discovery of a truly 
behavioral way of estimating the future, we cannot afford to be ashamed of 
extrapolating the observed regularities of the past. 
Knowledge in the field of population is evidently not directly usable in 
forecasting . Does it follow that an ignorant person will do as well as a highly 
trained one? After all, the methods of statistical forecasting were not developed 
with population in view, and to apply them calls for no special knowledge of 
what makes the birth rate rise and fall. 
Yet in fact the most trustworthy forecasts are carried out by demogra-
phers, who follow the population literature closely. We trust their results be-
cause at the many points where judgment enters , the demographer's intuition 
has been sharpened by exposure to the literature. The result may well be influ-
enced by demographic theory, even though no one can say at just what point in 
the calculation the theory was used. 
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Notes 
I Pascal Whelpton experimented exten-
sively with the components method in the late 
1920s and 1930s. Among Whelpton's prede-
cessors were Arthur L. Bowley (1924) and Ed-
win Cannan (1895). 
2 For a comment on the Heer study see 
Massey and Tedrow (1976) . 
3 For example, see Oechsli and Kirk 
(1974) , Seiver (1975, 1976), and Hicks (1974) . 
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